18 May 2025: Yet another significant Indian satellite mission failed today — EOS-09 (RISAT-1B). The PSLV-C61 lifted off successfully, but due to a sudden pressure drop in the third stage, the mission “could not be accomplished as intended.”
One question haunts everyone:
“Most of our satellites perform well, but why do our spy or strategic satellites repeatedly fail?”
Look at the pattern:
- EOS-03 (GISAT-1) – Failed
Launch: August 2021, GSLV-F10
Failure: Cryogenic stage ignition failed
Payload: Geo-imaging satellite for real-time border surveillance
Note: Initial launch was scrubbed T–4 minutes before due to an “unexpected anomaly.” There were covert claims that the launch was postponed under US pressure. On final launch day, cryogenic failure occurred — highly suspicious.
- EOS-09 (RISAT-1B) – Failed
Launch: 18 May 2025, PSLV-C61
Failure: Third-stage pressure drop
Payload: C-Band Radar satellite for day-night, all-weather surveillance
Note: Was intended to monitor China-Pak borders and the Indian Ocean Region from polar orbit.
But why are CartoSat, OceanSat, AstroSat functioning perfectly?
Because these missions:
Do not have confirmed military targeting roles
Aren’t restricted by American ITAR regulations or export compliance
Don’t provide strategic-grade surveillance imagery
The GISAT-1 story itself reveals the kind of pressure that exists:
Real-time surveillance from geostationary orbit means India would have a “permanently open eye” on the Earth.
The US reportedly raised concerns over India’s “non-cooperative surveillance capability.”
GISAT-1’s launch was postponed at least three times, once just 4 minutes before liftoff, even though the launch crew was fully ready — stopped due to external pressure from above.
When it finally launched, the cryogenic stage failed — an area where ISRO had already demonstrated repeated success.
Was that a coincidence, or electronic sabotage?
Are so many strategic satellite failures just accidents?
Western Proxy Influence or Direct Sabotage?
The upper-stage guidance and control systems of GSLV and PSLV depend on sensitive electronics.
Some components are still imported or use foreign IP-based sub-systems.
All it takes is a backdoor, a delay circuit, or a trigger injection — just a few lines of code.
An amateur hacker can’t do it.
But a hostile state actor certainly can.
What should India do?
- Develop military-grade tamper-proof chipsets (Joint DRDO + SCL initiative).
- Harden ISRO’s launch and ground systems against EMP and cyber threats.
- Make indigenous avionics and processors mandatory for all future surveillance payloads.
- Consider moving the **aeros
